Nigeria on the Edge of the Abyss by Looney, Robert
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications Collection
2015
Nigeria on the Edge of the Abyss
Looney, Robert
Nigeria on the Edge of the Abyss, The Milken Institute Review, Spring Quarter 2015
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/48225
12 The Milken Institute Review
tk
To judge by the aggregate numbers, Nigeria, by far 
the largest country in Africa in terms of popula-
tion, is showing signs of coming into its own in 
the new century. With GDP expansion averaging 
over 6 percent in 2000 to 2013, the economy has 
become Africa’s largest. In the process, it has grad-
uated to the World’s Bank’s list of lower middle-
income countries, with a GDP per capita (in terms 
of purchasing power) above $5,000. 
But that was in 2013. Today, there is little 
cause for celebration, as the country can no lon-
ger afford the luxury of ignoring a host of long-
festering problems that have been exacerbated 
by the recent collapse in the price of its cardinal 
export, oil. The government budget has been gut-
ted. Wretched transportation and electric-power 
infrastructure sharply constrain non-oil growth, 
while high youth unemployment and the divide 
between the impoverished Muslim north and 
the relatively affluent Christian south bolster the 
ultraviolent Boko Haram insurgency. Meanwhile, 
pervasive corruption makes every problem harder 
to solve and undermines civil society.
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Each of these factors will present a daunt-
ing challenge to the newly elected govern-
ment of Muhammadu Buhari – Nigeria’s first 
opposition candidate to be elected president. 
Taken collectively, they have prompted the 
U.S. National Intelligence Council (the public-
private group that serves as a link between the 
intelligence and policy communities) to ques-
tion both Nigeria’s ability to sustain its eco-
nomic growth and its long-term viability as a 
nation- state. In its 2005 “Mapping Sub-Saha-
ran Africa’s Future,” the NIC warned that Ni-
geria could collapse by 2020. In 2008, the NIC 
ranked Nigeria 13th on its list of the most 
likely candidates for state failure. By 2012, 
Nigeria had moved “up” the list to ninth – 
though the estimated date of its meltdown 
was extended to 2030.
The NIC’s forecasts are based on a projec-
tion in which Nigeria’s slide toward commu-
nal violence in the face of weakening social 
and political institutions pushes the country 
over the tipping point. None of this is written 
in stone, however. And in their defense, Nige-
ria’s boosters can point to trends running in 
the opposite direction. Gains in agricultural 
productivity, together with progress in gover-
nance reform and economic development at 
the regional level, have the potential to offset 
the dispiriting dysfunctionality of leadership 
at the federal level.
When Nigeria faced an equally dangerous 
tipping point after its 1967-1970 civil war 
(linked, no surprise, to ethnic conflict), the 
country survived – thanks in part to the balm 
of oil-export revenues that followed the rise 
of OPEC. With a technological shift that 
threatens to depress fossil fuel prices for the 
indefinite future, however, oil is unlikely to 
serve as the glue again. Now, survival will 
largely depend on whether Nigeria has the so-
cietal strength to rein in rampant corruption, 
invest wisely in development infrastructure, 
and manage ethnic and religious strife. 
some hard truths
Even in the best of times, Nigeria was ex-
tremely vulnerable to the volatility of the 
global oil market. Revenues from Nigeria’s oil 
exports account for more than 90 percent of 
the country’s export earnings and finance 70 
to 80 percent of the federal government bud-
get. As a result, Nigeria has been pounded by 
the 40 percent-plus fall in oil prices since 
mid-2014. 
Not only is the country facing massive 
shortfalls in oil revenues because of sagging 
prices, but it has relatively little hope of off-
setting the fall by increasing production in 
the near or middle term: with security issues 
in mind, foreign oil companies have invested 
little in exploration or development in recent 
years. Nigeria’s currency, the naira, has been 
allowed to depreciate since oil prices started 
to fall. But the decline (on the order of 20 per-
cent) won’t do much to stimulate exports. 
Meanwhile, managing to sustain imports has 
badly depleted the country’s foreign exchange 
reserves. As a result, the government has been 
forced to adopt a severe austerity program, 
even as expanded public expenditures are 
desperately needed to combat Boko Haram 
and make the infrastructure improvements 
required for both economic development and 
social stability.
Nigeria, like all oil-dependent economies, 
had plenty of notice that revenues could go 
down as well as up. And like some others, it 
established a buffer account to amass funds 
in boom times and disgorge them in hard 
times. By delinking government expenditures 
from oil revenues, the stabilization fund was 
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intended to insulate the Nigerian economy 
from external shocks. 
The idea of building cash reserves when oil 
revenues exceed a benchmark is sound. Un-
fortunately, when the fund was started, cor-
ruption was not factored in. As a result, Nige-
ria’s president was left with the final say as to 
how funds would be disposed. 
At the end of 2014, the fund had a balance 
of just $4 billion, compared with $9 billion in 
December 2012. Moreover, the bulk of the 
withdrawals took place before the second half 
of 2014, when oil prices were still high and the 
account balance should logically have been 
rising. Much of the decline resulted from rev-
enue diversion to assorted regional power 
brokers, whose support was deemed crucial to 
the success of President Goodluck Jonathan’s 
party in the 2015 elections. In 2013 alone, 
then-President Jonathan approved two $1 bil-
lion transfers from the fund to state governors.
With both the stabilization fund and for-
eign exchange reserves vanishing rapidly, the 
government had little choice but to propose 
boko Haram at work.















spending cuts exceeding 10 percent in its 
2015 budget. Most of the cuts will come from 
capital expenditures, meaning that critically 
needed infrastructure improvements will be 
shelved. The president, it seems, hadn’t lost 
sight of which side his bread is buttered on: 
the budget calls for increases in outlays for 
what can only been seen as patronage – nota-
bly, government salaries. 
Further exacerbating the effects of the oil 
price shock is the government’s failure to pass 
the 2008 Petroleum Industry Bill. As origi-
nally written, the PIB contained reforms that 
would have brought greater certainty to the 
rules regarding oil sector taxation, as well as 
altering the way in which oil revenues were 
transferred to the states and restructuring the 
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
(the place where foreign oil company royal-
ties go to disappear). The resulting uncer-
tainty over the rules of the oil game has pre-
dictably stifled foreign investment in Nigeria’s 
Mass transit in Lagos, old-style.
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oil sector, thus limiting expansion in produc-
tive capacity. 
One of the biggest casualties of Nigeria’s 
falling oil revenues is the country’s decaying 
infrastructure. Most Nigerian roads, refiner-
ies, railways, airports, power plants and water/
sanitation utilities date to the oil boom in the 
1970s. Since then, public investment has 
failed to keep pace with depreciation, let 
alone with rising needs in a country whose 
population has more than doubled since 
1980. Today, infrastructure inadequacy, espe-
cially in transportation and energy, poses 
major constraints to sustained, broad-based 
economic growth.
A 2013 African Development Bank report 
was politely scathing in its analysis of these 
infrastructure deficiencies, estimating that 40 
percent of the federal primary road network 
is in poor condition and that only 18 percent 
of the country’s 197,000 kilometer road sys-
tem is paved. The backbone of the rail net-
work is over 100 years old, and, as of 2007, 
only 25 percent of its trains were operational. 
But the imperative to protect political in-
siders trumps the needs of the common-
wealth. At 14 percent of the budget, govern-
ment capital spending will be well below 2003 
levels. And while Abuja has stressed that the 
sharp cuts in public investment are tempo-
rary, it hasn’t explained where the money will 
come from until oil makes a comeback. 
The one financing option is stepped-up 
borrowing, with a proposal already in the 
works to raise close to $18 billion over the 
medium to long term, mostly from China. 
Currently, Nigeria’s debt-to-GDP ratio is 
modest, thanks in large part to an interna-
tional debt pardon in 2005. Debt service costs 
could become problematic, however,  if the 
value of the naira continues to fall and oil rev-
enues effectively remain the sole source of 
foreign exchange.
the corruption curse
While inadequate funding has certainly con-
tributed to Nigeria’s infrastructure deficits, 
corruption may be equally to blame. The 
World Bank estimates corruption’s direct cost 
to Nigeria to be as high as 12 percent of GDP, 
with much of it originating in the contracting, 
construction and provision of infrastructure 
services. Corruption has not only increased 
the cost of construction, but also reduced its 
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quality and siphoned off user fees needed to 
service debt – not to mention undermined 
lenders’ willingness to finance the next proj-
ects and the next. 
According to the World Bank’s Worldwide 
Governance Indicators, Nigeria’s control of 
corruption, which showed significant im-
provement in 2003 to 2008, has deteriorated 
since President Jonathan took office. In 2008, 
Nigeria’s control of corruption ranked in the 
merely dismal 21st percentile among nations; 
by 2013, the country had fallen to a klepto-
cratic ninth percentile. 
Corruption is so ingrained that President 
Jonathan promptly dismissed the governor of 
the central bank for publicly suggesting that 
his administration was responsible for the ap-
proximately $20 billion in “missing” Nigerian 
National Petroleum revenues. 
growth without justice
Oil dependence polluted by rampant corrup-
tion – a pattern so common that economists 
refer to it as the “natural resource curse” – 
might alone be sufficient to explain Nigeria’s 
failure to lift a majority of its population out 
of poverty, or even to absorb the country’s 
rapidly expanding workforce. According to 
the World Bank, nearly two-thirds of Nigeri-
ans lived below the international poverty line 
of $1.25 a day in 2010. In fact, Nigeria’s cup of 
woes runneth over. 
In contrast to the East Asian tigers, which 
turned their young, underemployed labor 
forces into an asset for rapid, sustained indus-
trialization, Nigeria’s restless and frequently 
unemployed youth are a daunting liability. 
More broadly, social instability has been fed 
by the federal government’s inclination to use 
resources in ways that widen divisions along 
regional and religious lines rather than nar-
row them. 
Economic development favors the coun-
try’s Christian south over its predominately 
Muslim north. Poverty and unemployment 
are especially severe in the northeast, where 
the Boko Haram insurgency is based and 
finds the bulk of its recruits. In the northeast-
ern states of Adawama and Yobe, poverty 
rates range as high as 70 percent, while unem-
ployment is stuck near 35 percent. Similarly, 
in the neighboring state of Borno, where 
Boko Haram began, almost half the school-
age population receives no formal education; 
youth illiteracy is about 80 percent. 
These numbers are all the more shocking 
when viewed against an estimate by New 
World Wealth (a global market research firm 
focused on the rich) that the number of Nige-
rian millionaires increased by nearly half in the 
six years from 2007 to 2013. Not surprisingly, 
the country’s wealthy are concentrated in 
Lagos (the commercial capital), Abuja (the po-
litical capital) and Port Harcourt (the oil hub).
Barring a fundamental turnaround in gov-
ernance – one that deals directly with corrup-
tion, religious division and poverty – it’s hard 
to see how Boko Haram (or successor groups) 
will be eradicated. Even the armed effort to 
contain the insurgents in the north has been 
hindered by endemic corruption. There are 
widespread reports that the Nigerian military 
is demoralized because senior officers are ap-
propriating their pay along with money in-
tended to buy weapons.
points of light
It’s not hard to see how falling oil revenues, 
infrastructure dearth, corruption, chronic 
poverty and the insurgency might lead to a 
vicious circle, creating a truly failed state out 
of this highly imperfect one. But not all the 
news coming out of Nigeria is grim. 
Start with agriculture, which generates 
more than one-fifth of GDP and nearly one-
n i g e r i a  o n  t h e  e d g e
















third of employment. Thanks for the most 
part to benign neglect on the part of Abuja, 
farm output has been expanding at a rapid 
clip since 2000. Indeed, the Jonathan admin-
istration has been the first to show much in-
terest in agriculture, introducing what may 
turn out to be its main policy achievement: 
the Agricultural Transformation Agenda. 
Implemented in mid-2012, the ATA in-
cludes a series of initiatives aimed at reducing 
Nigeria’s increasing reliance on food imports 
as the population grows and the country ur-
banizes. And none too soon: Nigeria cur-
rently spends over $11 billion annually on 
imported rice and sugar, commodities in 
which it was self-sufficient during the 1960s. 
A major component of the ATA is the 
Growth Enhancement Scheme. This plan spe-
cifically focuses on agricultural productivity 
by subsidizing the costs of such major inputs 
as fertilizer and seedlings. It is also providing 
free mobile phones to farmers, which help 
provide timely information on input and 
crop prices and facilitate mobile banking to 
expand credit and payment options to this 
traditionally underserved group.
In 2013 alone, the ATA’s first full year of 
operation, the government claims that nearly 
a half million jobs were created – small 
change in a country of more than 170 million, 
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but a beginning. Success in raising productiv-
ity (though not reducing rural poverty) sug-
gests that agriculture could provide the next 
government some breathing room in coping 
with the decline in the oil industry. In the in-
termediate term, rising food production and 
declining food imports could help offset the 
most direct effects on consumers of oil-related 
volatility. And in the longer term, it may mod-
erate income and wealth inequality.
Just as the ATA has begun to demonstrate 
the economic potential of the Nigerian coun-
tryside, so the recent transformation of Lagos 
shows what ingenuity, hard work and im-
proved governance can accomplish in an 
urban context. Composed of many separate 
municipalities, the Lagos sprawl of 12 million 
(or 20 million by some estimates) was once 
the most corrupt, crime-ridden and public-
service-starved Nigerian state. 
Then, in 1999, Bola Ahmed Tinubu, an 
ambitious state governor, began experiment-
ing with ideas for beating back the chaos.
The initial stage of the experiment in-
volved raising revenues. Those who owed 
most of the tax had always found it easier to 
grease the relevant palms than to pay. The re-
form government initially contracted with a 
private company to collect taxes, offering it a 
percentage of the take as incentive. And it 
subsequently cleaned its own house, replac-
ing a compliant bureaucracy with one that 
owed allegiance to the reform governor. As a 
result, tax collections (adjusted for inflation) 
increased sixfold in 1999 to 2011. Nearly 
three-quarters of Lagos’ revenues are now in-
ternally generated, leading other states to fol-
low its example.
In exchange for getting residents to pay 
taxes, the Lagos state government expanded 
both public services and law enforcement. It 
has begun building and restoring basic infra-
structure, with 60 percent of the state budget 
now earmarked for capital projects. To raise 
Mass transit in Lagos, new-style.
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additional financing for infrastructure, the 
Lagos government has tapped bond markets 
and entered into a series of innovative public-
private partnerships. While each deal is indi-
vidually negotiated, these agreements gener-
ally involve a long-term contract in which a 
private party bears significant risk and man-
agement responsibility in return for substan-
tial profit potential.
Several of these partnerships have involved 
mass transit. In 2008, the Lagos bus system 
was re-launched under a PPP in which the 
state built the depots, terminals and dedi-
cated road lanes, while private enterprise pro-
vided the vehicles and operated them. Today, 
200,000 people use the system daily, making a 
dent in traffic delays in what was arguably the 
most congested city in Africa. 
Building on the success of the bus partner-
ships, the Lagos government is moving ahead 
with an ambitious light-rail project. Under its 
terms, the giant China Civil Engineering 
Construction Company will design and build 
the tracks and terminals, while a private Nige-
rian consortium called Eko Rail will supply 
the trains and operate the network for 25 
years. 
The transformation of Lagos shows that it 
is possible for a regional government – nota-
bly, one without oil revenues to corrupt it – to 
initiate a virtuous circle of economic growth 
and improved governance. In return for ex-
panded tax compliance, the Lagos govern-
ment has held itself accountable for increas-
ing the scope and quality of state services. In 
turn, these inputs increase the viability of 
businesses, enabling them to pay additional 
taxes to be used for further investments and 
improvements. 
Don’t expect the Lagos miracle to change 
the way the federal government operates. 
Even in the unlikely event that oil prices – and 
thus Nigeria’s federal budget – rebound soon, 
the country’s sagging infrastructure, region-
ally skewed development, high unemploy-
ment rates and widespread corruption con-
stitute structural impediments that would 
take decades to correct on the national level, 
if ever.  There isn’t much incentive for na-
tional politicians to hold themselves account-
able for correcting them as long as oil reve-
nues and foreign loans are available to buy 
support in the next election.
Moreover, don’t expect business – foreign 
or domestic – to save the non-agricultural 
sector. The World Bank puts Nigeria at 170th 
(out of 189 countries) on its Ease of Doing 
Business rankings – just ahead of Zimbabwe, 
but behind the likes of Iraq, Burkina Faso and 
Tajikistan. In part, that’s a reflection of the 
difficulty of conducting business in an envi-
ronment in which almost everyone in author-
ity has a hand out. In part, though, it is infra-
structure: Nigeria ranks a miserable 187th in 
business access to electricity.
Nigeria’s best hope is that the example of 
Lagos will spread quickly to other localities. If 
a virtuous circle of improved governance and 
inclusive economic development can be du-
plicated by more Nigerian states and munici-
palities, it may foster a bottom-up process – 
one that will place increasing pressure on 
Nigeria’s federal government to put its 
house in order. 
 There isn’t much incentive  
for national politicians to 
hold themselves accountable 
for correcting them as long  
as oil revenues and foreign 
loans are available to buy 
support in the next election.
